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RECREATIONAL USE OF TEXAS RIVERSRECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADOPTION OF THE
TEXAS PUBLIC RIVERS ACT
SUSAN B. BIGGS
Texas has one of the largest river systems in this country-over 80,000
miles of waterways varying from swampy, slow-moving currents in the east
to shallow, rocky streams in the west.' Over the years this natural resource
2
has become a significant recreational facility for fishermen and canoeists.
The public use of these rivers, however, is often subject to the conflicting
private interests of the riparian landowner. 3 The problem is compounded by
the relatively few miles of public riverbanks upon which a boater may alight
without fear of trespassing and by the lack of discernible demarcation
4
between public and private lands.
The conflict of interests between landowners and recreationists has
produced violence and hostility resulting from misconceptions by both groups
as to their respective legal rights. 5 On the one hand, the landowner claims a
1. TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE DEP'T, AN ANALYSIS OF TEXAs WATERWAYS 7 (1973).
2. A survey conducted in 1969 by the Texas Parks & Wildlife Department estimates
that in that year there were in total hours of activity, 8,647 days of rubber rafting,
305,872 days of canoeing, and a total of 606,523 days of all types of boating on rural
Texas rivers and streams. The department believes that river use has increased greatly
since 1969. See TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE DEP'T, TEXAS WATERWAYS; A FEASIBILITY
REPORT ON A SYSTEM OF WILD, SCENIC AND RECREATIONAL WATERWAYS IN TEXAS, at 19
(1973) [hereinafter cited as TEXAS WATERWAYS]. Two large manufacturers of aluminum
canoes experienced increased canoe sales in Texas, 136% and 500% respectively,
between 1966 and 1971. TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE DEP'T, PATHWAYS AND PADDLEWAYS;
A TRAILS AND SCENIC WATERWAYS FEASIBILITY STUDY 6 (1971).
3. For example, ranchers whose property abuts well-traveled rivers have complained that recreationists have frightened their cattle or cut their fences, and "secondhome" owners and ranchers alike have suffered from such problems as lack of privacy
and litter. See Fritz, Report on the Meeting at Junction; Property Rights and Invididual
Rights, at 3-4, April 1974 [hereinafter cited as Meeting at Junction] (meeting organized
for the purpose of conducting an in-depth study of approaches, attitudes, and techniques
toward improving human relations along boundaries between state-owned streambeds and
abutting private lands in Texas). It has been said that, to these landowners, "canoeists
represent just another intrusion, along with government officials and San Antonio real
estate developers, who threaten to carve up the countryside and destroy the natural and
scenic qualities of the river that has nurtured their families for over a century." Burton,
On the Waterfront, TEXAS MONTHLY, Vol. 3, No. 4, Apr. 1975, at 33. Some 600
landowners in the hill-country region have organized the Guadalupe River Association.
This group, represented by counsel, has opposed state river legislation.
4. TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE DEP'T, PATHWAYS AND PADDLEWAYS; A TRAILS AND
SCENIC WATERWAYS FEASIBILITY STUDY 5 (1971).

5. See generally Boyd, Guns Along the Guadalupe, THE TEXAS OBSERVER, Vol.
LXV, No. 18, Sept. 21, 1973, at 9; Burton, On the Waterfront, TEXAS MONTHLY, Vol. 3,
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violation of his vested property rights, while on the other, the recreationist
urges that he has been denied the right to use public facilities. Generally, this
conflict has manifested itself in three major areas: obstructions across rivers,
public use of riverbanks, and access to waterways. The scope of this
comment will include a determination of the legal basis of this conflict and a
proposition for resolving the conflict through statutory enactment.
PUBLIC RIGHTS IN RIVERS

There is a presumption that the control of navigable waters is an inherent

power of the state. 6 Under early common law, jus publicum, or the public
right, was the royal prerogative 'by which the king held shores and navigable
rivers for the common use and benefit of all his subjects who used those

areas for trade.7 That right could not be transferred to an individual without
legislative action. 8
In Texas, by statute, the waters of every flowing river and natural stream,
including all fish and marine life in those waters,9 are owned by the State. 10
The title to these waters is held by the State in trust for the public for a
number of purposes." One of the basic purposes is that of navigation, or the
right to pass over'the water and to use the subadjacent land for anchoring,
poling, or other incidents of navigation. 1 2 The Texas Supreme Court has
No. 4, Apr. 1975, at 32. Examples cited in these articles include a landowner's shooting
21 bullets into a canoe that had become lodged between boulders on the Guadalupe River
and the arrest, for trespassing, of an entire Boy Scout troop which had stopped for a rest
on a riverbank.
6. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
7. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 90 (1851).
8. Id. at 90.
9. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4026 (1966).

10. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.021 (1972). By contrast, private rights in water
depend on whether the particular state follows the riparian or appropriation doctrines of
water rights. See 1 R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 15-29, at 60-175 (1967); W.
HUTCHINS, THE TEXAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS chs. 6-8, at 101-409 (1961). See generally
1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAws IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 157-225
(1971). Texas law is a combination of both. See B. DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN
TEXAS WATER LAw 22-31 (1959); 1 W. HuTcHINS, WATER RIrHTS LAWS IN THE
NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 200-225 (1971); W. HUTCHINS, THE TEXAS LAW OF WATER

RIGHTS 101-62 (1961).
11. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 138, 86 S.W.2d 441, 445 (1935);
Chicago, Rock I. & G. Ry. v. Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement District
No. 1, 123 Tex. 432, 446, 451-53, 73 S.W.2d 55, 63 (1934); Mot v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82,
111, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926).
12. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 507 (1945) (all
riparian interests are subject to a dominant public interest in navigation); Penn Cent.
Co. v. Buckley & Co., 415 F.2d 762, 763-64 (3d Cir. 1969) (navigation is paramount use
of waterways and bridge tiers are permissible obstructions); Moti v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82,
111, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926) (regarded as a superior public right); see 1 R. CLARK,
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.4(A), at 198 (1967). Other purposes are: the use for
the benefit of the riparian lands, state control of non-riparian waters for the public
benefit of non-riparian waters, and other lawful uses and benefits. Motl v. Boyd, 116
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stated that the reservation of waters to the public implies all rights necessary
for the full use and enjoyment of the rights reserved and that a liberal
construction of this reservation is required. 13 The court has further held that
a grant of exclusive private privileges in Texas waters will not be upheld in
the absence of strict legislative authority. 1 4
Ownership of Riverbeds

The law in regard to ownership of the beds under these waters is somewhat more complex.' 5 The early common law held that only those streams
which are affected by the ebb and flow of the tide are navigable waters.' 6
This doctrine was soon deemed unworkable in the United States and was
replaced by a standard of "navigability in fact.' 1 7 Under this standard
rivers which are navigable in fact are navigable in law, and they are public
rivers whose beds are generally owned by the State.' 8 Based on their navigability and the State's ownership of their beds, they may be used by the
public for navigation, fishing, and other lawful purposes.1 9 Most states have
adopted the federal definition of navigable rivers;2 0 however, Texas is
Tex. 82, 111, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926). See also W. HuTcHmNs, THE TEXAS LAW OF
WATER RiGHrs 8 (1961).
Fishing, hunting, picnicking, and bathing are also allowed the public in its use of the
water, bed, and banks up to the line of private ownership. See, e.g., Briokell v. Trammell,
82 So. 221, 226 (Fla. 1919); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143-44 (Minn. 1893);
Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 138, 86 S.W.2d 441, 445 (1935).
13. State v. Bradford, 121 Tex. 515, 545-56, 50 S.W.2d 1065, 1077 (1932).
14. Landry v. Robison, 110 Tex. 295, 298, 219 S.W. 819, 820 (1920). In most
jurisdictions, the various private owners share the use of the water in nonnavigable lakes
and streams and may use the entire surface area for boating, fishing, and recreation.
Texas law, however, maintains separate rights over each privately-owned section of
water. See, e.g., Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791, 794 (Fla. 1959); Swartz v. Sherston,
300 N.W. 148, 150 (Mich. 1941); Snively v. Jaber, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Wash. 1956).
See also Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1935, writ dism'd) (landowner had exclusive fishing rights in area of lake directly above
his land); Fisher v. Barber, 21 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1929, no
writ) (suit to enjoin members of the public from hunting and fishing on private land that
was dry at time of grant, but subsequently flooded by waters of navigable stream).
15. For a thorough discussion of the historical aspects of bed ownership of Texas
rivers and streams, see Roberts, Title and Boundary Problems Relating to Riverbeds, 36
TEXAs L. REV. 299, 299-308(1958).
16. See, e.g., St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Ramsey, 13 S.W. 931 (Ark. 1890); Schulte v.
Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 785 (Ill. 1905) (ebb and flow test conclusive only to questions of
boundary and ownership); Miller v. State, 137 S.W. 706, 761 (Tenn. 1911); Griffith v.

Holman, 63 P. 239, 241 (Wash. 1900).

17. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971); The Daniel Ball, 77
U.S. 557, 563 (1870); Fairchild v. Kraemer, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825-26 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
In England virtually all rivers which are navigable in fact are affected by the ebb and
flow of the tide, but many American rivers are navigable for hundreds of miles above the
limits of the tidewater. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891).
18. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891); The Daniell Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563
(1870).
19. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 136, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1935).
20. This federal standard was set forth by the United States Supreme Court as
follows:
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among the minority of jurisdictions which have enacted independent stat21
utory standards for navigability.
Since 1837 Texas courts have determined bed ownership by applying the
"30-foot statute," which defines navigable streams as those retaining an
average width of 30 feet from the mouth up. 22 The courts have stated that
23
the bed of any stream which is navigable by statute is publicly owned.
Since the statute governs surveys of lands abutting navigable streams,
providing that those streams duly defined as "navigable" shall not be crossed
by any survey lines, 24 private ownership of the streambed is precluded by
ending the private property line at the river's edge.
This statute gave thousands of miles of riverbeds to the State which it
would not have owned under common or civil law, 25 primarily because the
statutory definition includes some waterways that may not be navigable in
fact. Whether statutorily navigable or navigable in fact, these streams are
owned by the public and consequently are subject to a public trust. 26
[T]hey are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in
their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water ....
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
21. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5302 (1962). See also IowA CODE § 106.2
(Supp. 1975) lakes and streams capable of supporting vessels carrying one or more
persons for a total of 6 months in one year out of every 10; Miss. CODE ANN. tit. 51, §
51-1-1 (1973) (rivers at least 25 feet wide and capable of floating a steamboat having a
carrying capacity of 200 bales of cotton); Wis. STAT. § 30.10 (1973) (all lakes and
streams navigable in fact for any purpose whatsoever).
22. TEAx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5302 (1962). Prior to 1837, bed ownership as
determined by Texas courts looking to Spanish and Mexican civil law depended upon
whether a stream was "perennial" or "torrential." Generally, the beds of perennial
streams, those which flow most of the year except in times of drought, were publicly
owned, whereas the beds of torrential streams, those which flow for only a short period
after a heavy rainfall, were privately owned by the riparian landowners. Heard v.
Refugio, 129 Tex. 349, 353, 103 S.W.2d 728, 730 (1937) (Mission River is perennial,
although not navigable in fact); Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 231, 56 S.W.2d 438,
446 (1932); McCurdy v. Morgan, 265 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954,
writ ref'd). For a discussion of this distinction see Hawkins, Title to River Beds in Texas
and Their Boundaries, 7 TEXAs L. REV. 493, 509-12 (1929). Under this distinction, land
grants made prior to 1837 carried private title to the center of torrential streams, but not
of perennial streams. State v. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n, 117 Tex. 53, 57, 297 S.W. 202, 203
(1927).
23. See Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 138, 86 S.W.2d 441, 445
(1935); Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. v. Tarrant County Water Control Improvement Dist.
No. 1, 123 Tex. 432, 446, 73 S.W.2d 55, 63 (1934); Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 110-11,
286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926); Austin v. Hall, 93 Tex. 591, 597, 57 S.W. 563, 564-65
(1900); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 106 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1937, writ dism'd).
24. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5302 (1962).

25. Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 233, 56 S.W.2d 438, 448 (1932).
26. Diversion Lake v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 138, 86 S.W.2d 441, 445 (1935); see
Austin v. Hall, 93 Tex. 591, 596, 57 S.W. 563, 564 (1900). See also United States v.
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
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Although Texas adopted the common law in 1840, as to streams it has
followed only those rules deemed harmonious with the basic principles of
Texas water law. 27 Therefore, ownership of the beds of streams classified as
navigable will, for the most part, remain in the State, giving the general
public rights in their use. 28 It has been held that grants made after 1837, of
those streams which are statutorily navigable, do not convey title in the bed
to the riparian grantees. 29 Conversely, if a river is nonnavigable under the
30
30-foot test, title to the riverbed will pass to the landowner.
The anomaly in regard to public recreation is that private ownership of
nonnavigable stream beds, although not determinative of the ownership of the
waters themselves, 3 ' will preclude public use of those waters.3 2 In Taylor
Fishing Club v. Hammett,33 the Waco Court of Civil Appeals found that a
lake used for many years for fishing, camping, and boating, but not used for
commercial navigation, was not navigable and therefore the bed was private-

27. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 135-36, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444
(1935) (Texas did not adopt the common law rule granting landowners an exclusive
right to fish in all non-tidal waters); Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 233, 56 S.W.2d
438, 447 (1932); see Roberts, Title and Boundary Problems Relating to Riverbeds, 36
TEXAS L. REV. 299, 301 (1958).
28. There are a few exceptions to this general rule. For example, under the Small
Bill, the State relinquished, to the original grantees and their assigns, title to certain
riverbeds crossed or partly crossed by original land grants and awards, but specifically
provided that such grants shall not "impair the rights of the general public and the State
in the waters or streams . . . ." Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5414a (1962). A
companion bill passed in 1955, relinquished title to grantees and their assigns under
deeds of acquittance to streambeds lying within the boundaries of those deeds. TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5414a-1 (1962). Art. 7467a relinquished State-owned titles to beds
lying within the corporate boundaries of cities having a population of 40,000 or more
according to the 1920 census. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7467a (1954). Since the
State has retained power to grant the soil beneath navigable public waters, the title to
riverbeds may be privately owned. State v. Bradford, 121 Tex. 515, 549, 50 S.W.2d 1065,
1078 (1932); Moore v. Ashbrook, 197 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1946, writ ref'd). But this grant must be specific and under legislative authority. National
Resort Communities, Inc. v. Cain, 479 S.W.2d 341, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972),
aff'd on rehearing,512 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ granted).
29. State v. Black Bros., 116 Tex. 615, 625, 297 S.W. 213, 217 (1927); Austin v.
Hall, 93 Tex. 591, 597, 57 S.W. 563, 564-65 (1900).
30. Where land is bounded by a nonnavigable stream, the boundary is the center of
that stream. Lee v. Grupe, 223 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949, no
writ); Dutton v. Vierling, 152 S.W. 450, 452-53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1912, no writ).
31. Private ownership of the bed does not carry with it ownership of the waters
flowing above that bed. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424
(1940); Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 202 F.2d 190, 198 (D.D.C. 1952), afl'd,

347 U.S. 239 (1954); State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 193 So. 9, 11
(Miss. 1940); Maples v. Henderson County, 259 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. It has been stated that "[lt]o whatever extent a state by statute or decision has
handed over any type of stream or lake bed into unqualified private ownership, it has
created an expensive barrier to future utilization of that resource for the public benefit."
1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 160, at 638-56 (1973).
33. 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1935, writ dism'd).
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ly owned.8 4 The court ruled that the private landowner had a right to control
that part of the lake surface above his land, including fishing and boating
rights, and that any interference with this right by another would be
considered an infringement of his riparian rights. 35 The practical consequence of private ownership is that those waterways are not within the
State's jurisdiction, and members of the public will have no rights in their
use.

Suitability Test
The definition of navigability, therefore, is primarily determinative of bed
ownership and secondarily determinative of public rights in the use of the
waters above those beds. It has been argued that in view of the declining use
of rivers for commercial navigation, a more reasonable standard for determining public rights would be that of suitability for any public use. 36 In an
early case supporting that view, the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that
under present conditions, boating or sailing for pleasure or profit should be
considered navigation, so as not to preclude public use of recreational
facilities by restricting to private ownership those waterways which are not
commercially navigable.37 Many years later the Supreme Court of Wyoming
held that the public has the right to use public waters of that state
irrespective of bed ownership, and that right should not be interfered with or
curtailed by any landowner.3 8
TEXAS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In recent years the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, the General
Land Office, and individual legislators have proposed unsuccessful legislation
pertaining to public use of Texas rivers.8 9 Critics maintain that legislative
34. Id. at 130.
35. Id. at 130.
36. See, e.g., 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER R-aHTs 214-17 (1967); Frey, The
Public Trust in Public Waterways, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 219, 231-34, 244-45 (1974);
Comment, The Vitality of the Navigability Criterion in the Era of Environmentalism, 25
ARK. L. REV. 250 (1971); Note, Public Fishing Rights, 12 Wyo. L.J. 167, 172 (1958).
37. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893). The court stated that
"[tlo hand over all these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow test of
navigability, would be a great wrong upon the public for all time, the extent of which
cannot perhaps, be now even anticipated." Id. at 1143.
38. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961).
39. See generally TEXAS WATERWAYS, at 9; Burton, On the Waterfront, TEXAS
MONTHLY, Vol. 3, No. 4, Apr. 1975, at 33-34; address by Dr. Terry Jordan, Dept. of
Geography, N.T.S.U., Denton, Texas, summarized in Meeting at Junction, at 4-5. One
bill attempting to create a scenic or natural waterways system for Texas was introduced
into the 61st Legislature. TEX. S.B. 319, H.B. 682, 61st Leg. (1969). This system was to
be composed of navigable rivers designated as natural river areas by subsequent legislative acts, to be administered by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. The proposed
legislative policy would have been "to preserve, develop, reclaim, and make accessible for
the benefit of all people selected parts of Texas' diminishing resource of free-flowing
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efforts to provide for a recreational waterway system in Texas will continually fail until the public develops an awareness of public rights in navigable
waters. Helpful legislation could be modeled after the Texas Open Beaches
Act, 40 which affirmed the public's ownership of the Texas Gulf beaches.
This act affirmatively declared that the public should have the right of access
to and enjoyment of state-owned beaches and any larger area where its
rights have been established through prescription or dedication. 4 ' Texas was
the first state in the nation to establish a state policy of preserving its beaches
for public use and benefit. 42 It is conceded that prescriptive use of Texas
riverbanks and access points is not as settled as the public's use of Texas
beaches, but the demand for river recreation is increasing, and a similar
statute in regard to rivers should be enacted to supply the same guarantees.

43

rivers." Although the bill passed the Senate, it was never reported from the House
committee.
The legislature, however, did appropriate funds for a two-year study to determine the
feasibility of establishing a waterways system in Texas, assigning responsibility for the
project to the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. Tex. H.B. 2, 61st Leg. (1969). The
results of this study, which was limited to a 22.5-mile stretch of the upper Guadalupe
River, were presented in the comprehensive publication, TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE DEPT.,
PATHWAYS

AND

PADDLEWAYS;

A

TRAILS

&

SCENIC

WATERWAYS

FEASIBILITY

STUDY

(1971), recommending establishment of a limited waterway park, to include the purchase
and development of five river campsites and the acquisition of a protective scenic
easement obtained through negotiations with riparian landowners. Id. at 9.
In 1971, the Texas Water Code was enacted as a comprehensive codification of Texas
water law, but, except for a provision that State water may be appropriated, stored, or
diverted for navigation, recreation, and public parks, there is no mention of public rights
in regard to recreational use of the state's rivers. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. art.
5.023(a)(6), (7), (9) (1972). In view of increased public use of Texas rivers, this
omission is noteworthy and indicates that the public has no single statutory source from
which to determine their rights. The legislature, however, has established a Senate
Interim Committee on Parks and Recreation, which has released a series of reports and
recommendations for clarification of the law regarding public rights to rivers. TEx. S.
RES. 235, 60th Leg. (1968); SENATE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON PARKS & RECREATION,
THIS LAND Is OUR LAND (1969); SENATE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON PARKS & RECREATION,
THIS LAND IS STILL OUR LAND (1973).
40. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5415d (1962).

41. Id. at § 1.

42. TEXAs GENERAL LAND OFFICE, TEXAS COASTAL LEGISLATION 3 (1974).

Oregon

has subsequently adopted a similar statute. ORE. REv. STAT. § 390.610 (1974).
43. In support of the analogy between public use of beaches and riverbanks, Prof.
Clark states:
The principle that the public has an interest in tidelands and banks of navigable
waters and a right to use them for purposes for which there is a substantial public
demand may be derived from the fact that the public won a right to passage over the
shore for access to the sea for fishing when this was the area of substantial public
demand. As time goes by, opportunities for much more extensive uses of these
lands become available to the public. The assertion by the public of a right to
enjoy additional uses is met by the assertion that the public right is defined and
limited by precedent based upon the past uses and past demand. But such a limitation confuses the application of the principle under given circumstances with the
principle itself.
1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER Rioirrs 202 (1967).
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A bill which would have accomplished this goal was introduced by Senator
Ron Clower of Garland during the 63rd legislative session. 44 The Texas
Public Rivers Act of 1973 proposed a codification of Texas water law
concerning public rights of recreational use. As its declaration of policy, the
bill confirmed the right of the public to the use and benefit of navigable
inland waterways. 45 Although the bill was never reported from the Senate
Committee on Natural Resources, it is urged that the bill can provide the
legislation necessary to alleviate the present problems between recreationists
and landowners. The following discussion of the law in regard to obstructions, riverbanks, and access will point out the need for statutory clarification
by means of a Texas Public Rivers Act.
OBSTRUCTIONS

The Texas Constitution guarantees to the public the right to navigation on
inland waters, 4 6 and it has long been state policy to guard navigable streams
47
from obstruction in order that they might be used for trade and travel.
Therefore, waterways should be free from obstructions placed by individual
landowners. Riparian landowners, however, sometimes have erected fences
across rivers incidental to ranching activities. 48 Fences that may not seem
reasonable to a recreationist using the river when the water level is normal or
high may be necessary in order to prevent livestock from crossing or
wandering along the river when the water level is down. The Attorney
General of Texas has stated that a landowner may not erect a fence which
49
prevents the public from floating or fishing along a river.
44. Tex. S.B. 533, 64th Leg. (1973).
45. The Act declared:
The law regarding the public use of property held in part for the benefit of the
public must change as the public need changes.
It is hereby declared and affirmed to be the public policy of the State of Texas
that the navigable inland waters within this state are reserved for the benefit and
use of the public, individually and collectively; and that the state should guarantee
the public's right to use these waters, provide the public the necessary facilities to
enable them to use these waters, and provide whatever regulation is ncessary for
the protection of these waters and the adjacent lands and landowners.
Id. at § 3(a).
46. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
47. Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Tex. 68, 71 (1863) (toll bridge across Angelina River must
be built so as not to impede navigation); accord, Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Meadows, 120
S.W. 521, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-1909, writ ref'd) (temporary bridge on Neches River
erected as base from which to make repairs on railroad bridge prevented lawful passage
of rafts of logs floating down to Beaumont); see Hamilton v. Vicksburg, S. & Pac. R.R.,
119 U.S. 280, 281 (1886) (construction work on railroad bridge obstructed commercial
navigation). Railroads have the right to build bridges across streams, but must do so in a
manner which does not infringe on the stream's usefulness to the public. TEx. REv. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6320 (1926).
48. Often a canoeist may find his passage blocked by these fences, or by lines or
cables erected for no clear purpose, and passage around these obstructions may result in
a charge of trespassing.
49. TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. S-107 (1953). The opinion was directed towards a
landowner who owned land on both sides of a highway right-of-way across the Trinity
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The Texas Public Rivers Act would prohibit the erection of obstructions
which may impede travel along a navigable river. 50 An exception would be
granted to a landowner who, because of the particular nature of the

waterway involved, found it reasonably necessary to place a fence across a
river to contain his livestock. 51 The determination of what constitutes a
"reasonably necessary" livestock fence raises a fact issue which might lead to
unnecessary litigation. The conflict between these two sections could be
mitigated by means of administrative criteria for reasonableness. Factors in
setting a reasonable standard should include a determination of low and
high-water levels on the river involved and the use to which the riparian land

is put.
Under the Texas Public Rivers Act, the Attorney General, or any County,
District, or Criminal District Attorney, would be authorized to file actions
seeking either temporary or permanent court orders or injunctions to remove
unnecessary obstructions restricting the public right of navigation. 52 In this
manner, the public would be guaranteed the right of redress.
PUBLIC USE OF RIVERBANKS

The Boundary Line Between Public and Private Ownership
Before a right to or prohibition against the use of riverbanks can be
considered, it is necessary to determine the line of demarcation between
public and private ownership. Since the State retains title to most navigable
streambeds, landowners have title only to the mean high-water line of these
streams. 53 The water level may change frequently in proportion to the
River, and who had tied his fence to that right-of-way, effectively preventing the public
from gaining access to the river. Id. at 2.
The San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals approved a landowner's proposal to build a
fence along his property which would run in and along the channel of the stream. Tyler
v. Gonzales, 189 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1945, writ ref'd
w.o.m.). The court felt that the fence as proposed would not constitute a nuisance or
interference with the public rights in the stream, but declined to discuss the legal
implications of a fence lying across the current of a stream. Id. at 522.
50. The Act provides:
It shall be an offense against the public policy of this state for any person to create,
erect, construct, or maintain any obstruction, barrier, or restraint of any nature
whatsoever which would interfere with the free and unrestricted right of the public,
individually and collectively, to use and enjoy the navigable inland waters of this
state . ..
Tex. S.B. 533, § 3(b), 63rd Leg. (1973).
51. The Act provides:
Any riparian owner may place and maintain a livestock fence across navigable inland waters if the placement of the fence is reasonably necessary to restrain the
movement of domestic livestock.
Id. § 5(a).
52. Id. § 7.
53. State v. Black Bros., 116 Tex. 615, 625, 297 S.W. 213, 217 (1927); Motl v.
Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 111, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926); Austin v. Hall, 93 Tex. 591, 597, 57
S.W. 563, 564 (1900).
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amount of rainfall; 5 4 consequently, it is often difficult for recreationists to
determine true boundary lines. Boundary determination has been a constant
source of litigation in Texas courts because each waterway must be evaluated individually to see if it is navigable according to the 30-foot standard. 55
The boundary line definition applied most frequently in Texas is that
declared by the United States Supreme Court in Oklahoma v. Texas,56
where the Court sought to apply the 30-foot statute in defining and marking
the boundary line between Texas and Oklahoma. It was defined as the
gradient of the flowing water in the river... located midway between
the lower level of the flowing water that just reaches the cut
5 7 bank, and
the higher level of it that just does not overtop the cut bank.
The difficulty of application is obvious. Neither landowners nor recreationists
can be sure where their rights begin, and it is often safer for the public to
remain in their boats than risk being charged with criminal trespass. 58 On
the other hand, landowners should not be confronted with recreationists
trespassing upon their lands.
Permitted Uses Under the Civil Law
Prior to 1837, when river navigation for commercial purposes was more
prevalent and construction of Texas land grants was governed by the Spanish
and Mexican civil law, private ownership of riverbanks was said to be
burdened with certain servitudes, allowing any person to moor his boat to the
trees along ithe shore, make repairs, or unload merchandise. 5 9 The Texas
Supreme Court, in one case, considered these servitudes in holding that title
to riparian land granted in 1835 by the government of Coahuila and Texas
was burdened with these rights of public use.60 The court stated that its
decision should be governed by the law applicable at the time of the grant. 61
54. Riverbed boundaries do not remain constant, and titles change from private to
public ownership and vice versa in accordance with the common law doctrines of
accretion, reliction, erosion, and avulsion. See Maufrais v. State, 142 Tex. 559, 567-70,
180 S.W.2d 144, 148-50 (1944); Hancock v. Moore, 135 Tex. 619, 623-24, 146 S.W.2d
369, 370-71 (1941); Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 225, 56 S.W.2d 438, 443-44
(1932).
55. See generally Hawkins, Title to River Beds in Texas and Their Boundaries, 7
TEXAS L. REV. 493, 498, 507 (1929); Roberts, Title and Boundary Problems Relating to
Riverbeds, 36 TEx. L. REv. 299, 308-18 (1958).
56. 265 U.S. 500 (1924).
57. Id. at 501.
58. For a report of incidents in recent years along the Guadalupe River where
canoeists using riverbanks as picnic areas have been charged with trespassing see Boyd,
Guns Along the Guadalupe, THE TExAs OBSERVER, Vol. LXV, No. 18, Sept. 1973, at
9. The significance of these incidents is that they illustrate confusion as to property
rights along rivers.
59. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 142, 86 S.W.2d 441, 447 (1935);
State v. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n, 117 Tex. 53, 58, 297 S.W. 202, 203 (1927).
60: State v. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n, 117 Tex. 53, 57, 297 .W. 202, 202-203 (1927).
See also TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. S-107 (1953).
61. State v. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n, 117 Tex. 53, 56-57, 297 S.W. 202 (1927).
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This type of servitude has been recognized in other states.6 2 For example,
in Louisiana the public is allowed to land their boats on the privately-owned
banks of navigable rivers, secure their craft to the trees, and unload and
deposit goods.63 These uses, however, must relate to navigation and commerce, and although fishing is probably permissible, there is no corresponding right to hunt or trap on the banks. 6 4 In states following the civil law rule,
the unreasonable use of riverbanks for purposes incident to navigation
entitles the landowner to reasonable compensation for damages resulting
65
from the excessive use.
6 found that a
The Supreme Court of Missouri in Elder v. Delcour"
reasonable use of riverbanks by recreationists was appropriate in that state.
The case concerned a suit to enjoin a private landowner from preventing a
canoeist from floating down and fishing in a river running through his
property. The court determined that the river was nonnavigable and the bed
privately-owned, but nonetheless held that the public had a right to fish in
those waters. 7 The fact that the canoeist had taken his craft out of the
water after encountering a log jam and portaged it across the privatelyowned riverbank was not considered significant by the court. Such action,
along with the right to wade the river was deemed a rightful incident to the
use of a public highway for travel. 68
In Day v. Armstronga9 the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to follow the
Missouri court in permitting wading or walking upon the riverbed or use of
its banks for recreational purposes. In determining the scope of public rights
in regard to floating upon the waters of the North Platte River the court
stated that any wading or walking in the riverbed which is more than
incidental to the right to float down the river would be an unlawful trespass
upon riparian lands.70 The court upheld a public use in those waters for
fishing, hunting, and pleasure, but required use of only the waters of the
streams themselves with only minor and incidental use of the subadjacent
71
lands.

62. See, e.g., Andrews v. King, 129 A. 298, 299 (Me. 1925)

(colonial ordinances

have reserved to the public a right to use shore for purposes of navigation, including
mooring vessels and taking on passengers); O'Fallon v. Daggett, 4 Mo. 209, 210 (1836)

(for emergency repairs); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 455 (West 1952).
63. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 455 (West 1952).
64. Yiannopoulous, The Public Use of the Banks of Navigable Rivers in Louisiana,
31 LA. L. REV. 563, 571 (1971).
65. Louisiana & Miss. R. Transfer Co. v. Long, 131 So. 84, 87 (Miss. 1930)
(boat moored on landowner's riverbank for an excessive length of time).
66. 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954).
67. Id. at 26.
68. Id. at 26.
69. 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
70. Id. at 146.
71. Id. at 147.
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The court based its conclusions upon Wyoming's constitutional declaration
that all waters within its boundaries belong to the state. 72 Thus, it distinguished its holding from that of Elder by observing that since Missouri did
not have such a constitutional provision, that court may have based its
holding on other considerations. 73 As previously noted, Texas has a similar
statutory declaration, 74 and the courts of this state could prohibit a broad
public use of riverbanks by following the Wyoming decision. Texas law,
however, can be differentiated from that of Wyoming in that the former is
based on Spanish and Mexican civil law, which permitted reasonable use of
the banks.
Case Law in Texas

The Supreme Court of Texas has declined to decide whether or not the
rights of the public to use streambanks bordered by grants made under the
civil law differ from public rights construed under our present statutory

conception of navigability. 75 The Attorney General, however, has stated that

the public is authorized by virtue of express legislative grants 76 to traverse
dry or submerged riverbeds which are privately owned. The Attorney
General reasoned that the statutory provision declaring that the Act should
not impair the rights of the public in the affected waters would reserve to the
77
public a right to walk in the streambed for fishing purposes.
72. Id. at 146; Wyo. CONST. art. VIl, § 1. For interpretation of a similar type of
constitutional provision in New Mexico, see State ex rel. Game Comm'n v. Red R.
Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 430-32, 464 (N.M. 1945). But the Colorado Supreme Court
rejected such an interpretation of a similar constitutional provision in that state. See
Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1905).
73. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 146 (Wyo. 1961).
74. The Texas statute declares that:
The water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural
stream, and lake, and every bay or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and the storm water,
floodwater, and rainwater of every river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression,
and watershed in the state is the property of the state.
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.021(a) (1972).
75. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 143, 86 S.W.2d 441, 445 (1935).
76. TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. S-208 (1956). The river in question was the Salt Fork
of the Brazos, where virtually all of the beds had passed from state to private ownership
under the Small Bill. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5414a (1962).
77. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. S-208 (1956). It is clear that as long as they
remain below the high-water mark on the bank, recreationists may hunt, camp, or fish on
those banks abutting grants made under the civil law. See Dincans v. Keeran, 192 S.W.
603, 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1917, no writ). In Dincans, the San Antonio
Court of Civil Appeals held that an injunction preventing recreationists from using a
riparian landowner's "pasture inclosure" for these purposes was too comprehensive,
because the inclosure in question included land between the low-and high water mark of
the stream. Id. at 604. There is also dicta in that case to the effect that hunting, camping,
and fishing are reasonable uses of the shorelines of navigable waters. In reviewing the
validity of an injunction preventing recreationists from entering upon the landowner's
pasture inclosure, the court found undisputed evidence that appellants had trespassed on
appellee's land for the purpose of hunting, fishing, and camping thereon. In noting that
the injunction covered too broad an area, however, the court stated that "[h]unting,
camping, and fishing are reasonable uses of the navigable waters and shore line." Id. at
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The Texas Supreme Court considered the question of public use of
riverbanks in Diversion Lake Club v. Heath.78 In that case the riparian
landowners had created a "private" lake by buying up shoreline on the
Medina River which was subsequently flooded by the lawful construction of
a dam. The landowners, who had formed a corporation, claimed that the
lake was private on the basis of the private ownership of the land beneath
the flooded area, and sought to enjoin members of the public from launching
their boats at an upstream highway right-of-way and floating downstream to
fish in the lake. The court held that the river waters were public property
regardless of bed ownership, and consequently the public had a right to fish
there without the consent of the riparian landowner. 79 Unlike rights governed by the civil law grants, the public had no right under common law
grants to go beyond the gradient boundary and use the banks for fishing,
camping, and other recreational purposes.""
Two opinions by the Attorney General issued subsequent to the decision
in Diversion Lake Club imply that the public has the right to make broader
use of the shore under the civil law than under the common law.8 ' In
considering what rights the public had to use the banks and sand bars on a
portion of the Trinity River lying between two grants made by Mexico in
1835, the Attorney General stated that the public may use the beds and
banks up to the gradient boundary for fishing and, if those areas are held by
virtue of civil law grants, the public may make certain uses of the banks
above that line.8 2 The contrast between the uses permitted under civil law
and common law is noteworthy. In effect, it means that public use of certain
streambanks depends upon the date of the grant. Of course, the common law
decisions would bear more weight than those made under civil law and
opinions issued by the Attorney General, but recreational use of Texas rivers
has increased to such a point that a limited public use commensurate with
that allowed for navigation under the civil law would be desirable.
Solutions Promulgated by the Texas Public Rivers Act

The Texas Public Rivers Act would allow a reasonable use of riverbanks
as an incident of recreational navigation, enabling recreationists to pass
604. The court made no mention of civil or common law, but it is presumed that the
shoreline boundary would be determined by whatever law controlled at the time of grant.
Id. at 604.
78. 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935).
79. Id. at 141, 86 S.W.2d at 447.
80. Id. at 141, 86 S.W.2d at 447. Such action under the common law would be
deemed a trespass.
An unsettled question is whether the common law in Texas permits a navigator to use
the shore in an emergency situation. Diversion Lake Club specifically left this question
open. Id. at 143, 86 S.W.2d at 447. From a viewpoint of boater safety, emergency use of
riverbanks to escape peril or to mend craft is essential.
81. TEx. Ar'VY GEN. Op. Nos. S-208 (1956), S-107 (1953).
82. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. S-107 (1953).
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around obstructions in the river without fear of trespassing.83 Support for
this provision is found in the cases which recognize a privilege of entering
upon private lands adjoining a public highway when that highway becomes
temporarily impassable.8 4 The Act, however, would not authorize a rest or
picnic stop on privately-owned lands. Such use would be permissible only on
the part of the bank which is public-land below the mean high-water mark.
It is urged that in reintroducing the bill, a means for adequately determining
the legal boundary line should be provided in order to eliminate misconceptions by recreationists.
The Act would also allow for emergency use of riverbanks.8

5

Although

tort law permits a reasonable trespass in an emergency situation, 8 it is
questionable whether a landowner would consider a damaged boat or one
lodged between obstacles in the river a sufficient emergency to justify entry

upon his lands. River recreation offers a peculiar situation, however, in that
access points are often many miles apart, an unreasonable distance to swim
for aid. Sometimes a brief use of the bank for repairing a boat or retrieving
lost equipment is all that is necessary, but other mishaps involving personal
87
injury might require walking across privately-owned land to seek aid.

RIGHTS OF AcCESS
Although the public has a right to travel on any navigable river in Texas,
rights of access to these waters are very limited. As a practical matter, one of
the few places from which a person can lawfully launch or remove a boat is

a highway right-of-way. 8 It has been held that the right to fish in public

83. The Act provides that:
[M]embers of the public may make such reasonable and limited use of the banks
and shores as may be necessary to enable them to return to the navigable inland
waters to which passage is obstructed by the livestock fence.
Tex. S.B. 533, § 5(b), 63rd Leg. (1973).
84. See Hedgepeth v. Robertson, 18 Tex. 858, 870-71 (1857); Gulf Prod. Co. v.
Gibson, 234 S.W. 906, 908-909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1921, no writ). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 195 (1965); H. TIFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY § 463, at 386 (3d ed. 1970).
85. The Act provides that any person who finds it reasonably necessary to make use
of the shore during an emergency which threatens his life, safety, or health, shall incur
no civil or criminal liability. Tex. S.B. 533, § 9, 63rd Leg. (1973).
86. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 195 (1965). If necessary to
the exercise of the privilege of deviation from a public highway, a person may break and
enter a fenced enclosure. Hedgepeth v. Robertson, 18 Tex. 858, 870-71 (1857).
87. Similar to incidents involving livestock fences, the problem arises of defining
reasonableness. Recreationists should not be permitted to abuse their privilege under this
Act unless the situation is a true emergency. Additionally, the problem from the
landowner's standpoint could be mitigated by the setting of an arbitrary distance from
the water's edge, the area within which the public could use to avoid hazards or make
repairs.
88. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 139, 86 S.W.2d 441,445 (1935).
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waters 0 does not give a corresponding right to access by trespassing across
private land. 90
Other states have faced the same difficulty in resolving conflicts between
landowner rights and public policy concerning access to rivers. Wisconsin is
probably the forerunner in providing legislation for public enjoyment of its
numerous water resources.9 1 A recent statute directs all new subdivisions
abutting navigable lakes and streams in -the state to provide public access to
the low-water mark at intervals of not more than half a mile. 92 Additionally
in all sales of public lands there is to be a reservation of public access to
those lands and to waters that are "navigable in fact for any purpose
whatsoever. '9 3 The legislature in that state has also condoned zoning for
scenic preservation purposes along shorelines as a valid exercise of a county's
police power. 94 Such a guarantee of public access and scenic preservation is
desirable in Texas in view of the diminishing natural river areas now being
subdivided for homesites.9 5
Public Access by Prescription, Dedication, and the Power of Eminent
Domain
In the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions for public access to
navigable rivers, a right-of-way of access by prescription may be acquired if
the public has exhibited continuous use, openly and adversely to the
landowner for the prescriptive period.96 By analogy, such a prescriptive right
89. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 136, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1935);

Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 362 (1859); Dincans v. Keeran, 192 S.W. 603, 604
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1917, no writ). This right is subject to obtaining a license

as provided in TEX. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 4032b-1 (Supp. 1975).
90. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 138-39, 86 S.W.2d 441, 445

(1935); accord, Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Waco 1935, writ dism'd); Smith v. Godart, 295 S.W. 211, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Texarkana 1927, no writ) (the legislature has no power to give a member of the public
the right to cross private land in order to fish in a land-locked lake).
91. For an extensive article proposing recommendations for a water recreation plan
for Wisconsin see Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested Solution,
1958 Wis. L. REy. 542.
92. Ws.STAT. § 236.16(3) (Supp. 1975).
93. WIS. STAT. § 24.11(3) (1973).
94. WIS. STAT. § 59.97(1) (Supp.1975).

95. Alaska isanother state which has realized the importance of providing public
access to waterways. The Alaska Constitution guarantees any United States citizen or
resident of Alaska "free access to the navigable or public waters of the state." ALAS.
CONST. art. VII, § 14 (1973). Courts in that jurisdiction have interpreted this guarantee
as a property right, to be construed as giving the broadest possible access to and use of
state waters by the general public. See Ketchikan Spruce Mills v. Alaska Concrete Prod.
Co., 113 F. Supp. 700, 701-702 (D.Alas. 1953).
96. See, Dickson v. Dickson, 24 So. 2d 419, 420 (Ala. 1946) (open and defined
road became public highway by prescription); Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, 103 So. 625, 626-27
(Fla. 1925) (under common law, 20 years of continuous and uninterrupted use would
render a road public by prescription); Blake v. Hickey, 41 A.2d 707, 708 (N.H. 1945)
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authorizes public access to Texas beaches under the Texas Open Beaches
Act. 97 The Act provides that in any suit brought where the land involved is
between the mean low tide and the line of vegetation, a presumption arises
that the area is imposed with a prescriptive right or easement in favor of the
public for ingress and egress to the sea. 98 It is doubtful, however, whether
prescriptive use of easements of access to Texas rivers equals that of beaches,
and even those areas which might meet the criteria would not fully solve the
river access problem in Texas.
Another means by which public access can be acquired is through
dedication, or the donation of land or rights therein to the public.9 9
Dedication requires only the landowner's intention to dedicate and acceptance by the public. 100 Continuous public use without objection and without
permission for more than five years has also been deemed to be a dedica10 1

tion.
A third means by which the public can gain access to public waters is
through the state's power of eminent domain. 10 2 One aspect of eminent
domain is the acquisition of a scenic easement. Basically, an easement is an
interest in land which gives rise to a property right entitling the holder to use
the land of another for a special purpose.' 03 For environmental purposes, a
scenic easement is a negative right in the state to prevent certain uses of the
10 4
land burdened with the servitude.
(20 years of continuous public use created public highway by prescription); Kisner v.

McCurry, 163 P.2d 963, 964-65 (Okla. 1945) (public highway acquired by prescription);
Austin v. Hall, 93 Tex. 591, 596, 57 S.W. 563, 564 (1900). See generally 7 R. POWELL,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1026, at 762.12-762.14 (rev. ed. 1974); Annot., 58
A.L.R. 239, 246-49 (1929). The prescriptive period in Texas is 10 years. Hollingsworth
v. Williamson, 300 S.W. 2d 194, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Maricle v. Hines, 247 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1952, no writ).
97. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5415d (1962).

98. Id. § 2.
99. See generally 11 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ch. 33
(3d ed. 1964); 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 934-36 (rev. ed. 1974);
H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY ch. 22 (3d ed. 1970).
100. Smith v. Kraintz, 20 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474 (Ct. App. 1962) (landowner's consent
shown by his testimony and conduct); Henry Walker Park Ass'n v. Mathews, 91 N.W.2d
703, 708-10 (Iowa 1958) (street and parking lot providing access to cemetery was
dedicated to public use and accepted by public); Smith v. Shiebeck, 24 A.2d 795, 800
(Md. 1942) (no particular form or ceremony is necessary); Flynn v. Beisel, 102 N.W.2d
284, 291 (Minn. 1960) (dedication rests upon intent rather than prescription).
101. Smith v. Kraintz, 20 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474 (Ct. App. 1962).
102. Austin v. Nalle, 102 Tex. 536, 538, 120 S.W. 996 (1909); Fort Worth &
D.C.R.R. v. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Crawford v. Frio County, 153 S.W. 388, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1913, no writ); Byrd Irr. Co. v. Smythe, 146 S.W. 1064, 1065 (Tex. Civ. App.--Sah
Antonio 1912, no writ). The procedure for the exercise of the power of eminent domain
in Texas is set out in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3264 (1968).
103. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 335 (2d ed. 1975); 3 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 405, at 386-402 (rev. ed. 1974); H. TIFFANY,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 392, at 320 (3d ed. 1970).
104. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-1804(3) (1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.280(3)
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Although some states have allowed for such condemnation in their
waterways legislation, 10 5 it is not considered appropriate for Texas at this
time because it has become such a sensitive political issue.' 0 6 Another
practical consideration behind this policy is its economic infeasibility. Largebe prohibitivescale land acquisition on Texas' extensive river system would
10 7
ly expensive in view of the high cost of riverside property.
Provisionfor Access Points in the Texas Public Rivers Act

The Texas Public Rivers Act provides for -the acquisition of private lands
for fishing and camping sites along the shores of navigable inland waters.' 08
It is recommended, however, that only existing public lands be utilized. This
is consistent with the current policy of the Texas Department of Parks and
Wildlife. 109 The Act also provides for a study by the General Land Office to
determine the extent and location of such public lands. 1 0
Remedies for Abuse by the Public

The problem of abuse by recreationists arises with increased public access,
and it becomes important to consider what action an affected landowner
might take to eliminate the problem."' A Washington case concerned a
state-built access from a highway to a lake." 2 In their use of the lake, some
recreationists unlawfully hunted on the adjacent property, harassed the
neighboring landowners, and littered the lakeshore with garbage and broken
glass. The lakefront owners successfully brought an action to enjoin the state
from maintaining its access area. The Washington Supreme Court held that
the state was "entitled to all the rights of a riparian owner, but i't should also
accept the responsibility of a riparian owner for the conduct of its licen(1952). Both of these statutes provide for scenic easements in the creation of a
Mississippi River Parkway.
Some of the restrictions imposed by a scenic easement are: (1) restrictions on new
building and major alteration of existing buildings, (2) allowance of necessary utilities
and roads, (3) prohibitions against the cutting of mature trees and shrubs, but allowance
for normal maintenance, (4) prohibition against dumping, (5) prohibitions against
advertising, and (6) maintenance of the general topography of the land in its existing
state. Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program, 45 DENY.
L.J. 168, 171-72 (1968).
105. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 146.280 (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
ch. 206, § 667 (1974).
106. See TEXAS WATERWAYS, at 25-26. See also Burton, On the Waterfront, TEXAS
MONTHLY, Vol. 3, No. 4, Apr. 1975, at 33.
107.

TEXAs WATERWAYS, at 25.

108. Tex. S.B. 533, § 10, 63d Leg. (1973).
109. The department believes that "complete public ownership of land corridors
along waterways is an unpopular alternative ... " TEXAS WATERWAYS, at 25.
110. Tex. S.B. 533, § 11(a), 63d Leg. (1973).
111. See Teclaff & Teclaff, Saving the Land-Water Edge from Recreation, for
Recreation, 14 ARIz. L. REV. 39 (1972).
112. Botton v. State, 420 P.2d 352 (Wash. 1966).
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sees." 118 The injunction was to be continued only until the state game
department presented a plan for the controlled operation of its property that,
in the opinion of the court, would adequately safeguard the rights of the
riparian owners.1 14 Although such an injunction seems extreme, it is imperative that the state regulate public use in areas particularly subject to abuse. A
section in the Texas Public Rivers Act provides regulation of those areas to
prevent damage to neighboring landowners." 15
FEDERAL SCENIC WATERWAYS LEGISLATION

The United States Congress in 1968 enacted the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, establishing a national system of wild and scenic rivers administered by
the Secretary of the Interior." 6 Although the Act began as a reaction to
federal dam building, it has become "an effort to limit the development of
certain rivers and their banks in the name of recreation." 1 7 The Act
designated eight rivers that automatically met the federal requirements of
being in a wild and free-flowing state"18 and designated a portion of the Rio
Grande River in Texas as one of 27 rivers for potential addition to the
national system. 1 9 Inclusion of these rivers is contingent upon studies to
20
determine whether they meet all requirements for national designation.
The Act encouraged states to include state and local stream preservation
programs in their outdoor recreation plans.' 2' In all, a total of 40 states are
113. Id. at 356.

114. Id. at 356. There was a dissent to the effect that the landowners should treat the
violations as criminal misdemeanors and complain to the authorities, rather than seek an

injunction. Id. at 362-63.
115. The Act provides that the Department of Parks and Wildlife may promulgate
rules and regulations to govern the administration, operation, and use of the lands, and
may issue permits to and impose fees upon recreationists using them. Tex. S.B. 533, §
10(d), 63rd Leg. (1973).

It has been suggested by the Land Commissioner that the Department of Parks and
Wildlife hire graduate students and station them at river crossings for the purpose of
offering information on river characteristics, the penalties for trespass, and time and
distance to the next point of egress, in addition to checking safety equipment and
providing litter bags. See Burton, On the Waterfront, TEXAS MONTHLY, Vol. 3, No. 4,

Apr. 1975, at 38-39.
116. 16 U.S.C. §H 1271-87 (1970).
117. Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REV.

707 (1970).
118. These rivers are the Clearwater, Middle Fork, Idaho; the Eleven Point, Missouri;
the Feather, California; the Rio Grande, New Mexico; the Rogue, Oregon; the St. Croix,

Minnesota and Wisconsin; the Salmon, Middle Fork, Idaho; and the Wolf, Wisconsin. 16
U.S.C. § 1274(a) (1970).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(20) (1970). A segment of the Guadalupe River from its
source to Canyon Reservoir was later named as a potential addition. Dep't of the Interior
Press Release

(Sept. 11,

1970),

reprinted in TExAs WATERWAYS,

App. B, at 36.

There has been no action to date on either of these rivers.
120.

16 U.S.C. § 1276(b) (1970).

121. The federal government also offers financial assistance to participating states. 16
U.S.C. § 1282 (1970).
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moving toward some sort of protection for their waterways by acting on this

congressional directive. 122 Texas is included in the minority that has taken
no action, although the Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife has found
that such a state waterways system is feasible.1 23 Results of field investigations conducted by the Department support the proposition that Texas waterways have the outstanding wild, scenic, and recreational qualities necessary
for inclusion in the system.' 24 A declaration of public policy in regard to the
use of Texas rivers for recreational purposes could be the first step toward
such a system and would at least bring Texas in line with federal policy.
CONCLUSION

Until the law is clarified and recreationists and landowners alike are
aware of their rights and responsibilities, conflicts and misunderstandings
between the two groups can be averted only through individual cooperation.
Our present laws, which are a confusing combination of diverse, outdated,
and sometimes conflicting laws, need to be clarified by legislative codification. It has been shown that although navigation is considered a superior
public right, passage along public rivers is often denied by unnecessary
obstructions. Recreationists and landowners alike are confused as to their
rights because the legal boundary separating them is difficult to ascertain.
Additionally, in order to enjoy full use of public rights in Texas rivers some
provision must be made for necessary shore use and access. A law guaranteeing the right of the public to use navigable rivers and at the same time
protecting riparian landowners from abuse of their vested rights would give
both groups a single source to which they might look for information and
redress.
122. E.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ch. 14, § 5093.50 (Deering Supp. 1974); GA. CODE
ANN. chap. 17-9, §§ 17-901-905 (1971); Ky. REv. STAT. § 146.200 (Supp. 1974); LA.

REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 8, § 56.1841 (West Supp. 1975). For a summary of state actions to
June 1973, see TEXAS WATERWAYS, App. C, at 37-40.
123. See TEXAS WATERWAYS, at 20. Most Texas waterways, because they are often
criss-crossed by roads and their banks are rather developed, will not meet the criteria for
inclusion in the federal program. Id. at 13.
124. Id. at 20-24. See generally TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE DEP'T, AN ANALYSIS OF
TEXAS WATERWAYS (1973).
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